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aving given himself the authority to invade Ukraine, Putin is now pushing right up 
against the red lines if he has not already overstepped them. This is the point at 
which regular diplomacy becomes inoperative, and the action becomes coercive, 
either through sanctions in the least bad case, or in the worst, war.  
Where exactly are the red lines? That may only be really revealed by events. But we have 
some clear markers. If Russia invaded the East Ukraine mainland, around Kharkiv or 
Donetsk for example, that would be the red line for Kyiv and the West. If sizeable armed 
groups of Ukrainian extremist nationalists invaded Kharkiv or Donetsk and entered into a 
real fight with local people there being killed, that would be crossing Putin’s red line, as 
would now be an attempt by the Ukrainian military to push all Russian troops back into 
their barracks in Sevastapol.    
For many people Russia has already crossed the red line in these last few days in Crimea. 
While criticising the EU for interference in Kyiv, and forgetting that its mediation during the 
last days of Yanukovich stopped the killing in Kyiv, Russia deployed troops to take over 
government buildings and airports. Well-armed, uniformed and equipped troops did their 
work with all identification badges removed and even the number plates of their military 
vehicles removed, and at first they refused to say who they were - ‘nobody knows’. A story 
for small children. This last weekend Russian troops have openly surrounded and blockaded 
Ukrainian military bases in Crimea, humiliating Kyiv. Obama calls for the Russian troops to 
get back into their barracks, but Putin ignores this.  
What happens when the red lines are crossed? As between Russia and Ukraine it would 
mean war, a real war, with incalculable consequences. Prime Minister Yatseniuk has already 
described Putin’s announcement as a declaration of war. The Ukrainian armed forces have 
received a general mobilisation order. The idea of Russians and Ukrainians really killing 
each other is mercifully still ‘unthinkable’, yet on this centennial anniversary of the first 
world war, we are reminded that big wars can be triggered ‘accidentally’ by small incidents. 
Putin’s presumed calculation is that his self-authorisation to go to war is intended to deter 
Kyiv from challenging him in Crimea, or to deter extremists for West Ukraine from attacking 
in the East. But there is no lack of small incidents ready and waiting to happen in Crimea 
and East Ukraine. 
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For the EU and US it would mean cold war, with progressive actions to make of Putin an 
international pariah and to build up sanctions against Russian economic interests. This has 
already begun, with Western withdrawals from preparatory meetings for the G8 summit in 
June. G8 could easily be discontinued in favour of returning to the old G7. To which could be 
added scrapping the EU-Russia summit in Sochi also in June, and resolutions condemning 
Russia put to the OSCE and Council of Europe, or proposals to suspend Russia’s 
membership. US Secretary of State, John Kerry, has already sketched the sanctions toolkit: 
visa bans, asset freezes, trade and investment measures. The EU could do the same with 
greater impact, and develop cooperatively with the US steps to substitute increasing 
amounts of US for Russian gas, the latter having declined to about a third of the EU’s total 
gas imports. Russia’s economy is already weak, and a further weakening would endanger 
Putin’s political base.     
There is still a small margin of possibility for cool heads to arrange de-escalation. There is a 
group of reasonable people now assembled as the government of Ukraine. But they do not 
yet have the street under control, and would need somehow to get the extremist militias off 
the street and into the democratic political process – let there be early parliamentary elections 
and let them try to get a few seats in the Rada. The EU for its part has to make it clear that its 
support for the new leadership in Kyiv is absolutely not a winner-take-all challenge to 
Russia’s economic interests. The origin of the conflict was Yanukovich’s refusal to sign with 
the EU under pressure from Putin to join his customs union. Even Putin must now see that 
Ukraine will not join his customs union. But Ukraine could have high-quality free trade with 
both the EU and Russia, and with goodwill these arrangements could perfectly well be 
designed technically to avoid conflict. How much pain does there have to be before there can 
be a return to such mundane and peaceful normality?    
